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Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand:
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Saleem Shaik, Keith H. Coble, Thomas O. Knight, Alan E. Baquet,
and George F. Patrick
A multinomial logit is utilized to model the choice of whether to purchase yield or revenue
insurance using subjectively elicited survey data. Our results indicate that the demand for
crop insurance is inelastic (20.40), consistent with most earlier yield elasticity estimates, but
the elasticity for choices between yield and revenue insurance is found to be relatively more
elastic (20.88).
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In recent years, a significant body of research
has focused on issues related to the expansion
of the U.S. federal crop insurance program. In
particular, agricultural economists have exam-
ined the demand for the products offered
under this program because of the fundamen-
tal policy issues associated with government
provision of subsidized insurance. Crop insur-
ance demand research in the 1980s and early
1990s largely focused on explaining why
producers were not participating in a program
that appeared to be more than actuarially fair.
While on average, the program was paying out
more than a dollar for every dollar producers
paid in premiums, the participation rate was
relatively low. Research by Coble et al. (1996)
and Goodwin and Smith suggested that the
program was likely affected by adverse selec-
tion, such that program participants were
earning significant positive returns while
nonparticipants perceived that they would
not receive a benefit, either in terms of
expected return or risk reduction, sufficient
to justify the premium.
Knight and Coble, and more recently
Glauber, point out that another major strand
of literature has examined asymmetric infor-
mation problems (i.e., moral hazard and
adverse selection) in crop insurance. The
adverse selection argument has been widely
accepted, and policy makers have substantial-
ly increased subsidies in order to induce crop
insurance participation by less risky producers
(i.e., to provide a strong subsidy incentive to
offset a negative actuarial incentive for low-
risk producers). Participation levels have
increased significantly, at least in part due to
the additional subsidy, which mitigates the
adverse selection problem.
In addition to increasing subsidies and
expanding the program, recent changes in the
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significantly modified the nature of the
products being offered to producers. In 1995,
the program offered only yield insurance.
Beginning in the late 1990s, a number of
initiatives were undertaken to develop revenue
insurance, and today there are three individual
revenue insurance products and one area
revenue insurance product available for some
crops (Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes). There
has been a significant shift in participation
toward the revenue insurance products. In
2004, 61% of corn and soybean crop insurance
policies insured revenue rather than yield.
While there is a significant body of
literature on crop insurance demand (e.g.,
Coble et al. [1996]; Smith and Baquet; Barnett
and Skees; Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin;
Shaik and Atwood; and Serra, Goodwin and
Featherstone), that literature largely concen-
trates on demand for yield insurance. Rela-
tively little research has been conducted that
specifically investigates the demand for crop
insurance in the context of a revenue insurance
program. Mishra and Goodwin examine the
national demand for crop yield versus revenue
insurance using the USDA Agricultural Re-
source Management Survey (ARMS) data.
A l s o ,S h e r r i c ke ta l .m o d e lw h e t h e rt o
participate in insurance, and the choice
between yield and revenue insurance for a set
of Illinois farms where long yield series were
available. Both studies provide insights into
the factors driving theses choices. However,
Sherrick et al. suggest that, ‘‘Future work
might further address the relationships be-
tween farmers’ preferences for insurance
products and their formation of expectations
about yield and revenue risk.’’ Our analysis
differs from the previous studies in that it
explicitly models subjective perceptions of
yield and price risk that underlie crop
insurance choices.
A rich body of literature suggests that
expectations that drive decisions under uncer-
tainty are contained in the decision maker’s
subjective probabilities and that these subjec-
tive probabilities can be elicited (Smith and
Mandac; Grisley and Kellogg; Norris and
Kramer; Eales et al.). In this paper we look
specifically at producer expectations for yield
and price variability as well as their percep-
tions of correlation between price and yield.
This is done by eliciting subjective probability
distributions from producers on price and
yield variability, as well as perceived correla-
tion. This information is used to develop
estimates of expected yield and the variability
of yield, which allows us to quantify the
expected indemnity from an insurance policy.
Also, the analysis is conducted in a way that
allows us to investigate the demand for yield
and revenue insurance. This is modeled in a
multinomial logit framework to address the
endogeneity of the insurance decisions—the
choice of whether to purchase yield or revenue
insurance. Finally, we also develop estimates
of the elasticity of demand for insurance,
which interestingly are found to conform to
previous estimates from the 1980s and early
1990s. Further, we report an elasticity of
demand for revenue insurance, which to our
knowledge has not been previously reported.
A Model of Yield and Revenue Insurance
Participation
A multinomial discrete choice model of crop
insurance participation and whether to opt for
yield or revenue insurance is developed
building on the participation model developed
by Coble et al. (1996). To model the unor-
dered choices of participation, yield, and
revenue insurance, we assume producers
maximize expected utility according to a von
Neuman-Morgenstern utility function defined
over wealth (W). Due to the discrete nature,
the producer compares the expected utility
among alternative choices—no insurance,
EUN(W) yield insurance, EUY(W), and reve-
nue insurance, EUR(W).
The expected utility model of the unor-
dered alternative choices of no participation,
yield, and revenue participation decisions can
be written as
ð1Þ
EUN ~ b’NX z eN
EUI ~ b’IX z eI
EUR ~ b’RX z eR:
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coefficients on exogenous variables X,a n deN,
eI,a n deR are random disturbances in Equa-
tion (1).
Conceptually, the expected utility evalua-
tion of these choices will be conditioned upon
the decision maker’s risk preferences and
subjective evaluations of the risks. Thus, the
individual’s risk preferences measured by risk
aversion, r, and initial wealth, w, are explan-
atory variables for the insurance decision. The
producer’s perception of the risk context can
be expressed by the subjective moments of
random yield and price and the perceived
correlation between the two. Because crop
insurance is not free, premium costs also enter
into the decisions.
Modeling of yield and revenue insurance
demand can be accomplished with an aggre-
gate expected return to insurance measure or
expected return to insurance decomposed into
first and second moments of yield and price,
yield–price correlation, and premium. Next,
we define the demand model with expected
return to insurance decomposed into first and
second moments of yield and price, yield–price
correlation, and premium. Thus we posit a
model of the decision to purchase yield
insurance, revenue insurance, or no insurance
that includes initial wealth and risk aversion
along with the first and second moments of
the subjective yield (my and sy) and price (mp
and sp) distributions; the yield–price correla-
tion, myp, and crop insurance premium rate, p;
and percentage of irrigated farm, irr,r e l a t i v e
to no insurance. Since there are three unor-
dered choices, the following discrete model is
estimated:
ð2Þ




where the choice j is equal to zero for no
insurance, 1 for yield insurance, and 2 for
revenue insurance.
Collapsing the first and second moment of
yield and price, yield–price correlation, and
premium in Equation (2) into expected return
to insurance, ERI,p r o v i d e su sw i t ht h e
aggregate expected return to insurance model.
This can be written as
ð3Þ Prob Choice ~ j ðÞ ~ fw ,r,ERI ðÞ :
Following Maddala, the unordered discrete
choice of participation, yield and revenue
insurance demand defined in Equations
(2) and (3) can be defined using the gen-
eral representation of the multinomial logit
model as
ð4Þ
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j ~ 0,1,2,
where zero is equal to no insurance, 1 for yield
insurance, and 2 for revenue insurance; i is the
number of observations used in the analysis.
Since the probabilities sum to one, we can set
one (no insurance) of the parameter vectors
say b0 equal to zero. Then the probabilities of




















The effect of the independent variables can be
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Farm Survey and Data
A survey was conducted in the spring of 1999
to identify the risk management objectives of
grain and cotton producers and their percep-
Shaik et al.: Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand 759tions and understanding of alternative risk
management tools and strategies (for details,
see Coble et al. 1999). The survey was
conducted in four states in which corn,
soybeans, cotton, and grain sorghum produc-
tion are important: Mississippi (cotton, soy-
beans), Texas (cotton, grain sorghum), In-
diana (corn, soybeans), and Nebraska (corn,
soybeans). These states were chosen to
reflect differing production regions and
crops. Each state’s Agricultural Statistical
Service was contracted to sample from their
pool of commercial farms. After excluding
small, noncommercial farms generating less
than $25,000 in gross income, the sample
w a ss t r a t i f i e da c r o s sf o u rc a t e g o r i e so fg r o s s
farm income. A Dillman three-wave design
(Dillman) was used to mitigate nonresponse
bias. The surveys were sent to producers
prior to planting in the spring of 1999. A
reminder card was sent two weeks following
the first mailing, and a second mailing was
sent to those who had not returned a survey
2 weeks after the postcard reminder. The
response rate for the survey was 27%.A
response rate of 27% is somewhat low, but is
consistent with response rates in mail sur-
veys (Dillman) of this magnitude. Respon-
dents to this survey were slightly older and
farms slightly larger as compared to the 1997
Census of Agriculture with farms greater
than $10,000 in sales. This is especially true
for Indiana and Mississippi. Direct compar-
isons with the Census are difficult because
this sample was restricted to those farms
with more than $25,000 in sales. However,
the similarity of the respondents to popula-
tion estimates suggests that the sample is
reasonably representative, with the caveat
that the sample may be slightly biased
towards larger farms. Even with 27% re-
sponse, the distribution (see Table 1) of corn
and soybean producers across the three
choices—purchased no insurance, yield in-
surance, and revenue insurance allows us to
model the behavioral response to explana-
tory factors. The focus of the analysis
reported in this paper is corn and soybean
farms from three states. Specifically, this
study utilizes 367 and 411 usable question-
naires returned by corn and soybean pro-
ducers, respectively, in the states of Indiana,
Mississippi, and Nebraska.
Variables
First and second moments of producer yield
and price distributions are computed based on
elicited distributions. Similarly, the yield–price
correlation and risk aversion are also subjec-
tively elicited based on producers’ perceptions.
Percentage of irrigation and wealth are based
on information provided by the producers.
Information on the premium rate at the 65%
coverage level was obtained from RMA rate
tables for specific type, practice, and location
by crop.
The first and second moments of each
producer’s yield and price distributions are
computed based on questions capturing the
mode, the tenth fractile, and the ninetieth
fractile of each distribution. Using this infor-
mation, the first and second moments (mean
and variance) can be computed (Lau, Lau,
and Zhang) as:
ð7Þ
Mean ~(x 0:10 fractile z 2   Mode
z x 0:90 fractile)=4
Variance ~ (x 0:90 fractile
{ x 0:10 fractile)=2:65
where x is yield or price.
Premium rate is the actual production
history rate at 65% coverage provided by
RMA based on the type, practice, and
location by crop. If the producers perceived
that prices moved inversely to yields, the
yield–price correlation variable was coded as
one and zero otherwise. Risk aversion was
based on the farmer’s self-perceived willing-
ness to accept risk relative to other farmers.
Finally, the wealth variable was computed as
assets minus the borrowed percent of total
dollars invested in the operation.
Table 1 provides definitions and summary
statistics for the variables employed in the
analysis. A mean of 1.114 on the choice
variable for corn indicates that 23%,4 2 %,
and 35% of corn producers purchased no

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shaik et al.: Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand 761insurance, yield insurance, and revenue insur-
ance, respectively. Similarly, a mean of 0.706
on the choice variable for soybean indicates
that 47%,3 4 %,a n d1 8 % of the soybeans
producers purchased no insurance, yield in-
surance, and revenue insurance. The first and
second moments of corn yield, based on the
subjective distributions, averaged 137.67 and
28.59 bushels per acre respectively, while the
first and second moments of soybean yield
averaged 36.59 and 9.55 bushels per acre,
respectively. The first and second moments of
corn (soybean) price were $1.95 and $0.32
($4.95 and $0.58) per bushel, respectively. The
dichotomous negative yield–price correlation
variable averaged 0.66 for corn and 0.43 for
soybeans. The average risk aversion response
of 3.25 and 3.19 for corn and soybean
producers respectively, seems consistent with
a fairly high level of risk aversion. Expected
loss costs (ELC) generated from the beta
distributions were 1.7% for corn and 3.2% for
soybeans. Average actual production history
(APH) premium rates charged to corn and
soybean producers were 4.6% and 8.8%,
respectively. Subsidized APH premium rates
charged to corn and soybean producers were
2.7% and 5.1%, respectively. Expected return
to insurance (ERI) is defined as expected loss
cost minus the subsidized actual production
history premium rate (note both are on a
percentage basis). The average expected return
to insurance for corn and soybean farms were
21.0% and 21.9%. On average, the wealth of
corn and soybean farms was around $0.98 and
$0.81 million, respectively.
Empirical Application and Results
An empirical application of the producer
decision to purchase yield or revenue insur-
ance is modeled using data from a survey of
corn and soybean producers in Nebraska,
Indiana, and Mississippi. Aggregate expected
return to insurance result from the multino-
mial logit model (Equation 4) is reported in
Table 2. Results from the multinomial logit
model (Equation 4) with expected return to
insurance decomposed into first and second
moments of yield and price, yield–price
correlation, and premiums are reported in
Table 3. Parameter estimates, marginal ef-
fects, and elasticities of all the variables are
presented.
Table 2 presents the ERI results. The signs
of parameter estimates on expected return to
insurance in the demand for yield or revenue
insurance relative to no insurance are positive
and significant. Producers with high expected
returns would be more likely to purchase yield
or revenue insurance, while those with low
expected returns to insurance would become
Table 2. Regression Results of the Multinomial Logit Model Using Survey Data with
Aggregate Expected Return to Insurance
Variables Parameter Coefficients t-Ratio Marginal Effects Elasticity
Choice to purchase yield insurance relative to no insurance
Intercept 0.585 3.40 0.069 0.199
ERI 9.886 3.54 0.732 20.081
Risk aversion 0.0003 20.85 0.0001 0.010
IRR 0.806 3.63 0.170 0.123
Wealth 20.122 21.48 20.017 20.044
Dummy (soybean 5 1) 20.875 24.88 20.074 20.189
Choice to purchase revenue insurance relative to no insurance
Intercept 0.647 3.57 0.058 0.261
ERI 15.404 5.13 1.772 20.165
Risk aversion 0.0003 0.54 0.0001 20.019
IRR 0.139 0.54 20.055 20.079
Wealth 20.110 21.17 20.008 20.033
Dummy (soybean 5 1) 21.277 26.42 20.141 20.411
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ed acreage is positive and significant in the
demand for insurance equation but not in the
revenue insurance demand equation. This
indicates producers perceive, ceterus paribus,
a better insurance value with irrigated acreage;
hence, they are more likely to insure their
crops but are less likely to purchase revenue
insurance. Risk aversion and wealth variables
are not significant in either equation. The
dummy variable for soybean crop is negative
and significant in the yield and revenue
insurance participation decisions. This indi-
cates that soybean producers are less willing
than corn producers to purchase yield or
revenue insurance.
Results of the multinomial logit model with
expected return to insurance decomposed into
first and second moments of yield and price,
yield–price correlation, and premium are
reported in Table 3. For the yield insurance
participation decision, the parameter estimate
on mean yield is negative and significant,
indicating that high yield producers would be
less likely to purchase insurance, with an
elasticity of 20.41. This result is consistent
with earlier results of Goodwin, Skees and
Reed, Smith and Baquet, and Sherrick et al.
based on varying crops and regions. Yield
standard deviation has a positive sign but is
not statistically significant at the 10% level.
The sign on expected price is negative and
significant at the 10% level, with an elasticity
of 20.67. This result suggests that farmers
perceive a need to purchase insurance when
expected prices are low. However, the param-
eter estimate on price standard deviation is not
statistically significant, indicating that per-
ceived price risk does not affect the insurance
purchase decision. Yield–price correlation is
not found to be significant in this model.
Producers with larger acreage under irrigation
are more likely to purchase insurance. Premi-
um rate is strongly significant and takes a
Table 3. Regression Results of the Multinomial Logit Choice Equation Using Survey Data with
the Decomposed Expected Return to Insurance
Variables Parameter Coefficients t-Ratio Marginal Effects Elasticity
Choice to purchase yield insurance relative to no insurance
Intercept 4.439 3.59 0.606 1.778
Ymean 20.018 22.52 20.002 20.411
Ystd 0.009 0.73 20.002 20.126
Pmean 20.491 21.78 20.050 20.670
Pstd 20.003 20.68 20.001 20.146
YPcorr 0.142 0.78 20.002 20.010
Risk aversion 20.001 21.53 0.0001 0.015
Premium rate 215.291 24.47 21.191 20.397
IRR 0.701 2.67 0.155 0.113
Wealth 20.116 21.37 20.014 20.037
Dummy (soybean 5 1) 20.448 20.40 20.092 20.155
Choice to purchase revenue insurance relative to no insurance
Intercept 3.860 2.86 0.218 1.199
Ymean 20.019 22.43 20.002 20.489
Ystd 0.039 2.87 0.006 0.405
Pmean 20.597 21.77 20.053 21.052
Pstd 0.005 1.24 0.001 0.235
YPcorr 0.340 1.61 0.044 0.096
Risk aversion 0.0003 20.50 4.21E-06 0.0009
Premium rate 222.313 25.15 22.292 20.885
IRR 0.018 0.06 20.067 20.093
Wealth 20.124 21.26 20.010 20.044
Dummy (soybean 5 1) 20.078 20.06 0.031 0.050
Shaik et al.: Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand 763negative sign as expected. The associated
elasticity is 20.40, which falls in a range
similar to previous yield insurance demand
elasticity estimates. Other variables of interest
from the expected utility framework—risk
aversion and wealth—are not statistically
significant. Our only explanation for this
result is that perhaps crop insurance is so
highly subsidized that risk preferences play a
diminished role in this decision. The soybean
crop dummy variable is not statistically
significant in the yield insurance participation
equation, indicating that the producer decision
to participate is indifferent compared with
corn.
In the revenue insurance decision, the
parameter estimate on mean yield is negative
and significant, indicating producers with
higher expected yields are more likely to
purchase revenue insurance relative to no
insurance. With a positive and significant
parameter estimate and an elasticity of 0.40,
higher variation in the yield is found to
encourage producers to purchase revenue
insurance. In this model, the expected price
level is significant at the 10% level, but the
parameter estimate on price variability is
positive and not significant. Producers realiz-
ing higher mean prices are less likely to
purchase revenue insurance. Being insignifi-
cant, producers with larger acreage are indif-
ferent to the purchase of revenue insurance.
However, the positive and significant sign in
the yield insurance decision suggests that
producers with larger irrigated acreage are
more interested in mitigating yield risk than
price risk.
Price elasticities of crop and revenue
insurance demand have the expected negative
signs and are statistically significant. Our
estimated elasticity for yield insurance demand
of 20.40 is higher than Barnett and Skees’s
price elasticity of 20.15 but lower than those
of Coble et al. (20.65 [1996]), Goodwin and
Kastens (20.51), and Smith and Baquet
(20.58 to 20.69). Results on the price
elasticity of revenue insurance demand indi-
cate an elasticity of 20.88, which is somewhat
higher than the elasticity of demand for yield
insurance. This is consistent and correlates
with the introduction of revenue insurance
products like income protection, crop revenue
coverage, and revenue assurance.
Conclusions
This paper revisits the demand for crop
insurance, a topic widely examined in the
1980s and early 1990s as economists attempt-
ed to explain why participation was relatively
low in a program with subsidized rates. In the
mid-1990s and again in 2000, subsidies were
increased dramatically and revenue insurance
was introduced and widely adopted during
this period. The net result is a program with
much higher participation rates and evidence
of improved actuarial soundness. Our results
show an elasticity of demand for yield
insurance that remains largely unchanged
from earlier estimates (20.40) even though
our estimates are derived from subjective data
and almost all previous estimates were based
upon objective data. We go on to estimate the
elasticity for choices between yield and reve-
nue insurance, an area where there are
essentially no previous estimates for compar-
ison. We find this elasticity to be relatively
greater (20.88) than the yield insurance
elasticity. Not surprisingly, farmers who per-
ceive greater yield risk are more likely to
insure. However, our results also show that
farmers who perceive relatively higher expect-
ed yields or prices are less likely to insure.
Taken together, we would characterize this
result as a ‘‘revenue effect’’ on insurance
demand. In other words, producers who
perceive high yields or prices feel less at risk.
Thus, they demand less insurance. When
evaluating the relatively recent option to
purchase either yield or revenue insurance,
we find a clear tendency for farms with greater
perceived yield risk and price risk to choose
revenue insurance. There appears to be no
direct reason why farmers with relatively high
yield risk would desire revenue insurance,
however it may relate to the ‘‘upside’’ price
risk coverage offered by the CRC or RA–
HPO products that provide greater per unit
indemnities if prices have risen prior to
harvest.
764 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008Finally, there are clear policy implications
of this work. First the inelastic demand for
yield insurance confirms that relatively large
subsidies would be required to entice new
participants and further reduce the justifica-
tion for ad hoc disaster legislation. Although,
revenue insurance has been widely adopted
and has a slightly more elastic demand than
yield insurance, it still has an inelastic demand,
which suggests that it will not likely entice
many more people into the program.
[Received March 2007; Accepted January 2008.]
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